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'DEC,OLONJ,Z ING' PUERTO RICO,
U.S. STYLE
PEDRO A. CABAN, Ph.D.

If the United States Committee on Energy
and Natural Resources has its way, Puerto
Rico's political status may finally be
resolved by the end of 1991.
Congressional committees, an Executive
Branch task force, the leadership of
Puerto Rico's established political parties
and dozens of law firms and professional
lobbyists will be engaged in heated
negotiations for the next year in a process

that may result in a referendmn on the
three status options: Statehood, Independence or "Enhanced Commonwealth." The
proposed Puerto Rican Status Referendmn
Act (U.S. Senate Bill S-712), co-sponsored
by Senators Bennett Johnston
(Democrat-Louisiana) and James McClure
(Republican-Idaho), provides for .the
referendmn to be held in Puerto Rico on
June 4, 1991.
continued on page 7...
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'DECOLONIZING' PUERTO RICO, U.S. SlYLE
Pedro A. Caban
(continued from cover)

intention to "present a proposal for consultations on
the status issue." Card gave Hernandez Colon the
option of calling for a referendum.4

It was on January 17, 1989 that leaders of Puerto
Rico's three electoral parties signed an historic
statement calling on President George W. Bush to
begin a process to resolve Puerto Rico's troubled
political status.1 The event was unusual for three
reasons:

The U.S. federal government's decision to authorize
the referendum appears to have been the product of
more than a decade of internal discussions and policy
reviews on the problem of Puerto Rico's status at the
highest levels of the Executive Branch.5 The Carter
Administration was cautiously moving toward
proposing a plebiscite on the Island's future status,
with independence as a viable option.6 Since the late
1970s, numerous studies on the subject have been
published by think tanks, research centers and
government agencies? Despite this flurry of
intellectual activity, the Reagan Administration did not
promote status change. Whatever the reasons for this
notable inactivity during the Reagan years, President
Bush's decision to act seems to have been the
outcome of a process that has been percolating for
over a decade. When the 10lst Congress convened
in January 1989, Senator Bennett Johnston and the
Bush Administration were prepared to move quickly
on the referendum.

.f:ml. during his reelection campaign, Puerto Rico
Governor Rafael Hernandez Colon assured the
country that, if elected, his Administration would
concentrate on addressing Puerto Rico's serious social
and economic problems and not seek to alter the
Island's political status. But, to the surprise of many
political observers, the Governor, in his inaugural
address in January 1989, called for a plebiscite to be
held during his tenure.
Second. the three major parties issued a statement
that "since Puerto Rico came under the sovereignty of
the United States of America, under the terms of the
Treaty of Paris in 1898, the people of Puerto Rico
have not been formaUy consulted by the United States
of America as to its preference on the final political
status...2 (author's translation from the Spanish) The
phrase was significant; for the first time the
pro-commonwealth Partido Popular Democratico
(PPD) publicly declared that the Commonwealth is
not a compact of free association by two sovereign
peoples.3

.Third. while each political party has tried individually
to persuade the U.S. government to initiate a consulta
on Puerto Rico's political status, their January
statement was the first joint public call for the U.S.
government to do so. Barely six months later, the
U.S. Senate Committee on Energy and Natural
Resources drafted three status-related bills that would
permit the people of Puerto Rico to choose among
the three status options.

The question that everyone is asking is why the U.S.
government chose this moment in time to initiate the
referendum process. Juan Manuel Garcia Passalacqua,
the well-known Puerto Rican political commentator,
has for years been telling Puerto Ricans that
Washington believes the huge financial costs of
keeping the colony are unacceptable. By the
mid-1980s, these policy makers, he reports, were
discussing how to ease Puerto Rico toward
independence.8 The problem of skyrocketing budget
deficits, which dominated much of the 1988
presidential campaign, provided the necessary context
for the Bush Administration to initiate the referendum
process.
Ruben Berrios Martinez, President of the
pro-independence Partido lndependentista
Puertorriqueno (PIP) considered the following reason
decisive:

Why a Referendum Now?

The speed with which these events have unfolded,
after nearly four decades of U.S. inaction on the status
of Puerto Rico, leaves little doubt that the joint
statement of January 17, 1989 was encouraged, if not
actually proposed, by Washington. Qaridad, the
newspaper of the pro-independence Partido Socialista
Puertorriqueiio (PSP), reported that the Bush
Administration was prepared to hold a referendum on
the status issue soon after the President's
inauguration. On January 1, 1989, Andrew Card,
White House Deputy Chief of Staff, informed
Hernandez Colon that he had instructions from
President Bush to announce the Administration's

Since the end of the Second World War,
fundamental changes have occurred at the
international level that require important internal
adjustments to the North American economy and
demand new directions in the foreign policy of
that nation to adapt to the present global
economy and new geo-political realities.9 (author's
translation)
Others have argued that the timing of the referendum
was in reaction to the meeting of the UN
Decolonization Committee (the so-called "Committee
of 24") that has considered the question of Puerto
Rico's colonial status annually for the last decade.
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The U.S. Senate Committee worked feverishly to
conclude the hearings and drafted the referendum bill
before the Committee of 24 met on August 16 and 17,
1989. By including the independence option in S.712,
the Bush Administration hoped to persuade the
Committee of 24 that the referendum process
conformed to international law and to not take up the
matter of Puerto Rico.
Another factor that may help to explain the timing of
the referendum initiative is the decision by U.S.
strategic planners to promote a more comprehensive
geo-political and economic strategy for the Caribbean
that requires a "redefinition" of Puerto Rico's status
and role in the region. In a ViUage Voice article, Ed
Morales pointedly observed: "As the priorities of U.S.
military power shift from the cold war to the drug
war, and as Ronald Reagan's Caribbean Basin
Initiative ...works to prevent the reemergence of mixed
economies like Michael Manley's Jamaica and
Maurice Bishop's Grenada. a reassessment of Puerto
Rico's status now seems overdue."10
Manuel Casiano, publisher of the influential Caribbean
Business, a weekly based in Puerto Rico, says the
referendum was strictly Hernandez Colon's idea. He
argues that the Governor wanted a referendum on the
status issue because his extremely narrow margin of
victory in the last gubernatorial elections made him
vulnerable, and he wanted to "stop the statehood p~
once and for all before the next election."1
According to this view, Hernandez Colon felt that the
political climate was propitious to obtain
Congressional support for some changes in the
Commonwealth formula. which would ultimately
benefit his Administration. Casiano is echoing doubts
that the Bush Administration wanted to move on the
status issue at this time, a theory that enjoys
considerable support in some independence circles.

The U.S. Senate Hearings

Whatever the reasoning behind the Bush
Administration's decision to proceed in January 1989
with its "decolonization process," it was ready to
quickly put into place an agenda for change. The first
set of exploratory talks with the presidents of the
Puerto Rican Independence Party (PIP), the Partido
Popular Democratico (PPD), and the pro-statehood
Partido Nuevo Progresista (PNP), took place during
the last week of February 1989. Party platforms and
conditions for participating in the referendum, the
procedures for conducting the consulta and a
preliminary timetable for the referendum were
arranged at these meetings.12 Each representative
agreed to provide proposals to the Senate Committee
on their respective party's status options, the so-called
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"wish lists," to be included in the Committee's draft
legislation.
Three sets of hearings were initially scheduled. The
first hearings were held in early June 1989 in
Washington, D.C., and were limited to testimony from
the Island's three electoral political parties. This was
followed by another set of hearings in San Juan in
mid-June, limited to individuals and organizations
invited by the Senate Committee. The third set of
hearings was scheduled again in Washington in early
July to hear the Bush Administration's reaction to the
status proposals.

June I and 2, 1989 Hearings: Capitol Hill
In his opening statement, Senator Johnston cautioned
that the effects of any status change would have to be
revenue neutral, meaning the U.S. government would
not approve status proposals that increased the federal
deficit. He drew attention to "the harsh fiscal reality
facing Congress" that would "make budget 'neutrality'
an objective during its consideration." If a status
"definition includes an increased benefit," Johnston
pointed out, "then Congress will be looking for a way
to offset the cost of that benefit."13
Johnston assured the Island's representatives that it
was Congress' intention to respect the wishes of the
people of Puerto Rico and abide by the referendum
results. Once the S.712 referendum results are
ratified, the preferred option would go into effect
without further Congressional action - the so-called
"self-executing" provisions of the bill.
During the hearings in Washington, each proposal
submitted by the political parties in Puerto Rico was
scrutinized and challenged by the U.S. Senate
Committee. Briefly, virtually all of the elements
included in the PPD proposal for "enhanced
commonwealth" were deemed unacceptable by the
Committee. Senators Johnston and McOure rejected
any changes in existing legislation that implied a
diminution or constraint in the exercise of
congressional and executive branch powers over
Puerto Rico.
The U.S. Senate Committee expressed serious
reservations with the pro-statehood position that
Spanish be recognized as the official language of
Puerto Rico. It also cautioned statehood forces
against expecting immediate and sizable increases in
federal transfer payments without a concurrent
phasing-in of federal taxes.

In response to the PIP's proposal for the
demilitarization of Puerto Rico, Johnston and
McOure insisted that the U.S. would not relinquish its

~pnng
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military bases. The PIP recognized the security
interests of the United States and agreed that the
issue of the military bases was negotiable. All the
parties called for retention or lengthy phase-out of
section 936 of the Internal Revenue Code.14

9

with no reservations." She warned that "the process of
decolonization should be carried out free of any ...
interference by colonial powers."16
July 11, 13 and 14: Back on Capitol Hill

June 16, 17 and 19 Hearings: San Juan

In its hearings conducted in Puerto Rico, the U.S.
Senate Committee explicitly rejected United Nations
jurisdiction over the referendum. The U.S. Senators
argued that by acceding to the PIP's condition for the
transference of sovereign powers if independence is
the preferred status, the U.S. had complied with the
requirements of international law on the right of
self-determination. This position was challenged by
the PIP, who maintained that all three status formulas
must provide for the transfer of sovereignty in order
to comply with the UN resolution on decolonization.
In Puerto Rico, Senator Johnston was decidedly more
conciliatory to the commonwealth and statehood
proposals. The concept of Spanish as the official
language for Puerto Rico was not expressly rejected
and was left for future negotiation. The PPD was
assured that the U.S. was sensitive to the needs of the
Commonwealth government to have some input in
assessing the domestic impact of federal legislation.
These hearings allowed a wider cross section of
political and social forces to express their views on the
proposed referendum. Carlos Gallisa, President of the
Puerto Rican Socialist Party, provided one of the most
dramatic moments in the hearings when he challenged
the legitimacy of the referendum process Congress
had devised. Gallisa called on the U.S. Senate
Committee to recognize Puerto Rico's colonial status
and argued that "this is of primary importance because
if you disavow the nature of the problem, that Puerto
Rico is a colony, then nothing will be solved by the
hearings; we would be repeating the futile exercise of
1967 and would be holding the same mockery of a
plebiscite."15
Witnesses from different political sectors called for the
Senate Committee to comply with international law in
drafting the referendum bill. Gallisa called upon
Congress to comply with resolution 1514 (XV), which
he referred to as the "Magna Carta of
Decolonization.• Nora Matias Rodriguez, President of
the Colegio de Abogados de Puerto Rico, asked that
U.S. Senate Bill 712 be amended to provide for a
constituent assembly that would draw up an alternate
proposal conforming to internationally accepted
standards of self-determination. She called upon the
U.S. government to "renounce all power and authority
exerted over Puerto Rico, transferring [it] to the
people of Puerto Rico in an unconditional manner and

The hearings held in Washington gave the Bush
Administration an opportunity to present its reactions
to the three status formulas. Serious reservations
were expressed about each of the options, although
Administration representatives reaffirmed President
Bush's preference for statehood.
Virtually all the elements of the "enhanced
commonwealth" proposal were challenged. State
Department representative Mary V. Mochary argued
that the enhanced commonwealth proposal would
create an unprecedented political status and "would
grant to Puerto Rico significant attributes of
sovereignty which would be incompatible with
remaining part of the United States." The
Department, she declared, objected to delegating
Puerto Rico authority vested in the Executive Branch
by the U.S. Constitution and the PPD's proposal for
Puerto Rico to enter into international agreements
was "most objectionable." She testified that as 1ong
as Puerto Rico enjoys a status less than that of
independence," it could not gain greater freedom to
participate in international organizations than it is
currently permitted.17 The Bush Administration
reaffirmed the U.S. Senate Committee's opposition to
"enhanced commonwealth."
The Bush Administration reacted most favorably to
the statehood proposal, and its officials repeatedly
noted the statehood option posed the least difficulty
with respect to the issues of concern to the Executive
Branch. Nonetheless, objections were raised to
proposals for the use of Spanish in the U.S. District
Court, the matter of excise taxes, tariffs on imported
coffee, the 200-mile jurisdiction of territorial waters,
and the provision for Congress to enact an omnibus
bill to "ensure that the people of Puerto Rico attain
equal social and economic opportunities with the
residents of the several states." Despite these
concerns, the statehood proposal received a very
favorable review by the Bush Administration, which
chose not to raise explicit objections to re~g
Spanish as an official language of Puerto Rico. 8
While the Administration was not dismissive toward
the PIP proposal, it left little doubt that a
demilitarized Puerto Rico was unacceptable.
Brigadier General MJ. Byron asserted in his
testimony that, "the Department of Defense considers
Puerto Rico as a strategic pivot point of major
importance to U.S. national security.. ." and strongly
recommended that the seven military installations in
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Puerto Rico (including the huge Roosevelt Roads
complex) be retained.
Although he did not categorically reject the PIP's
request for the U.S. to recognize "the right of the
people of Puerto Rico to strive toward the total
demilitarization of its territory,· Byron cautioned that
such a policy would involve degradation of U.S.
military capabilities and impose enormous financial
costs on the federal government.19 U.S. State
Department representative Mochary was more blunt
in her testimony, stating that, "Owing to the strategic
importance of existing military installations and
operations in Puerto Rico," the provision calling for
the Republic of Puerto Rico to close its territory to
any and all military forces of foreign nations was
"directly at odds with U.S global military interests...20
But, it was Senator Johnston who got to the core of
the issue when he admonished: "We must ensure in an
independence situation ... that Puerto Rico would not
become a Soviet base or a Cuban base...2 1
Dynamics of the Senate Bill

The U.S. Senate Committee revised each of the three
proposals and approved S.712 by a slim margin of
eight to eleven on August 8, 1989.22 Legislative
activity, however, has been unusually slow and marred
by frequent claims that the PPD is relying on its allies
in the U .S. Congress to derail the status legislation.
Senator Johnston has been visibly annoyed at the Bush
Administration's laggard response to his request for
reports and position papers, and with the seeming
procrastination by its interagency task force to exercise
leadership in the referendwn process. Serious
Congressional divisions on key provisions of S.712
threaten to scuttle the referendum.

The Legislative Process
S.712 was submitted to the U.S. Senate F'mance
Committee, chaired by Senator Lloyd Bentsen
(Dem.-Texas), the 1988 Democratic candidate for
Vice-President. But the Fmance Committee waited
until November 15, 1989 to hold hearings on the
revenue and expenditure effects of S.712. Puerto
Rico's political party leaders essentially reaffirmed the
economic provisions of their original proposals. The
Finance Committee may hold an additional hearing
before drafting a revised version of S.712.
Despite pressure from Senator Johnston, Ron de Lugo
(Dem.), Delegate to the U.S. Congress for the Virgin
Islands, who chairs the U.S. House Insular and
International Affairs Subcommittee that has
jurisdiction on the referendwn, failed to introduce
legislation in 1989. De Lugo has held hearings in 1990
thus far in Washington, DC, Puerto Rico and
announced that he will hold one in New York City.

He also observed that the referendum bill was bogged
down in the U.S. Senate. Assuming that the
Subcommittee does introduce a bill, it is expected to
differ significantly from S.712. A conference
committee will have the difficult task of writing a
compromise measure before submitting the revised
bill to the full Congress for a vote.
Congressman Ronald Dellums (Dem.-California)
introduced a House Joint Resolution "to submit to the
Puerto Rican electorate in a referendum...the offer of
full empowerment to a Constitutional Assembly
elected by the people of Puerto Rico ... " The resolution
calls for the Legislative Assembly of Puerto Rico, and
not the U.S. Congress, to conduct the referendwn. It
requires the Legislature to "guarantee the proportional
representation of all political parties and independent
slates that.,8resent canctidates to the Constitutional
Assembly.
The resolution is an attempt to be
consistent with the principle of self-determination as
specified in the UN resolution 1514 (XV) and concurs
with the Colegio de Abogados de fueno Rico's position
on decolonization. The Dellums resolution has been
bottlenecked in the U.S. House Subcommittee on
International Economic Development and Trade since
April 4, 1989.
Self-Executing Provisions
The self-executing provision of S.712 is the most
troublesome feature of the bill for Congress.
According to this provision, the status option that
obtains a simple majority of the Island vote will
automatically go into effect within a period specified
in the legislation, with no further congressional action
required. 24 Immediately after the bill was approved
by the Johnston Committee, House Speaker Thomas
Foley (Dem.-Washington) questioned whether
Congress can commit itself to a prospective act that
accepts the referendum results as bincting upon their
certification, "rather than a two-stage process where
we hear the results of the Puerto Rican plebiscite and
then commit ourselves ...to reflecting those wishes in
legislation...25
The U.S. House leadership announced it would not
introduce S.712 because of its self-executing provision.
Virgin Islands Delegate de Lugo insisted that the
three Puerto Rican political parties drop the provision
as a condition for his Committee to introduce a House
referendurri. status bill. However, because of intense
opposition by the PNP, he may decide to permit each
of the parties to submit its own bill. But, he is
insistent that "self-execution doesn't have a chance ...26
This development did not surprise Ruben Berrios,
who has maintained all along that the provision would
commit Congress to granting Puerto Rico statehood
if its people chose this option, something he is certain
Congress will not permit.
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Eliminating the self-executing provts1on raises the
obvious concern that the U.S. government could seek
further changes and impose additional conditions
before certifying the status option chosen by the
Puerto Rican people. To include a requirement that
Congress should not legally commit itself to
automatically accept the referendum results would
appear to violate the clause in S.712 that stipulates
the U.S. "recognizes the principle of self determination
and other applicable principles of international law
with respect to Puerto Rico." The Puerto Rican
political party leaders contend that without Congress'
prior commitment to accept all the provisions of the
winning o.ption, the plebiscite would be a mere "beauty
contest...2
Costs of Status Otange
Puerto Rican independence and commonwealth
advocates, as well as some members of Congress,
contend that S.712 is unbalanced because it "front
loads" or gives more economic advantages to the
statehood option. Hernandez Colon insists that by
providing for a marked increase in benefits to
impoverished Puerto Ricans once the Island becomes
a state, the pro-statehood PNP's prospects for victory
are significantly enhanced. In an arrant attempt to
counter this bias in the bill, Governor Hernandez
Colon pleaded before the Senate Finance Committee
for an additional $2 billion in increased federal
transfer payments for the enhanced commonwealth
proposal. A San Juan Star article in November 1989,
reported that
Rubin Berrios, President of the Puerto Rican
Independence Party, was particularly vehement,
warning Congress against giving Puerto Rico
residents "a cornucopia of (federal funds) if they
vote for the present status of political
subordination.•
The Report submitted with bill S.712 addresses this
issue:
Specifically, concerns were raised that there is a
tilt toward statehood because there are a number
of programs (Food Stamps, Medicaid, Aid to
Families with Dependent Children) on which.
effective January 1, 1992, the existing Federal
"caps" on benefits would be eliminated and
recipients of these program benefits might thus be
encouraged to vote for statehood ... The
Committee's action should not be interpreted as
an endorsement of Puerto Rico's present
treatment, but simply a recognition that such
treatment would not be Constitutionally
permissible under Statehood.28
Ironically, it is uncertainty about the costs to the U.S.

government that caused a number of Senators to vote
against S.712. U.S. Senator Kent Conrad (Dem.North Dakota), who voted against the measure,
thought the Committee lacked sufficient information
on the fiscal impact of statehood and worried "that the
budgetary implications of this measure are large, and
the federal budget deficit is too big for the Committee
to rely on imprecise numbers ...29
To counter these misgivings, Carlos Romero Barcelo
(PNP) argued that, 'The only way to reduce this
deficit is through statehood and bringing the U.S.
citizens of Puerto Rico into the federal income tax
system." He noted that only statehood would provide
the "federal government with a positive revenue
flow ...lO
Yet, a Congressional Budget Office report, released
on November 2, 1989, estimates federal payments for
all entitlement programs would increase substantially
under statehood. Federal average monthly adult public
assistance payments are currently capped at $32, and
are expected to jump to $.360 if Puerto Rico becomes
a state. In addition, total federal costs were estimated
at $9.3 billion for the four-year transition period
before Puerto Rico is absorbed into the federal tax
system. Committee member Senator Malcolm Wallop
(Rep.-Wyoming) reacted that S.712, "... misleads the
people of Puerto Rico by inducing beneficiaries of
various programs to vote for statehood in order to
obtain immediate increases in welfare benefits--- even
though within a few years the loss of the special tax
programs could mean a massive 1~ of jobs and
greater impoverishment of the Island. 1
The Future of Section 936
has been already pointed out, economic
considerations have been at the center of the public
hearings and negotiations on the proposed
referendum. In particular, the future of Section 936
has transfiXed the Puerto Rican leadership, the U.S.
Senate Committee and the Bush Administration.

As

Section 936 of the Internal Revenue Code is a
complex fiscal measure that essentially permits U.S.
corporations with subsidiary branches in Puerto Rico
to repatriate earnings derived from these operations
without paying taxes to the federal government.
Section 936, when combined with the generous
industrial incentives, including tax exemptions and low
wages provided by the Commonwealth government
and Puerto Rican labor, has converted the Island into
an incredibly profitable investment site for
international conglomerates. In the pedestrian words
of Treasury official Kenneth Gideon, "Because Puerto
Rican tax law provides generous exemptions to certain
business operations there, Section 936 corporations
enjoy a low aggregate effective tax rate ...32
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Why did the Puerto Rican Independence Party (PIP)

call for a twenty-five year phase-out of Section 936
instead of its elimination 7 Simply · put, because the
multinational corporations that migrate to Puerto Rico
are the mainstay of the economy. These multinational
corporations are primarily in the pharmaceutical,
scientific instruments and electronics sectors; however,
labor-intensive textile and apparel industries also
benefit from Section 936 tax credits. According to a
recent report by the Puerto Rico, U.SA. Foundation
(a lobbying organization in Washington representing
more than 70 corporations with operations in Puerto
Rico), approximately one-third of the Island's
employment is directly or indirectly related to these
936 corporations.33

The referendum bill provided the U.S. Treasury
Department an opportunity to advance its goal of
eliminating Section 936. Treasury apparently
persuaded Senator Johnston that provisions for an
accelerated phase-out of Section 936 benefits should
be included in the statehood and independence
options.37 In the hearings in Puerto Rico, Senator
Johnston was most insistent that the provision for a
twenty-five year phase-out (which all the parties
supported) was unacceptable. He demurred that, "The
desire in eliminating the 936 funds is because people
think that it is an expense for the Treasury of the
United States." 38 (author's translation) Johnston also
concluded that,
It is a problem of having your cake and eating it
too. You see, each of the three statuses has stated
its wish list of what they want. And each wants
all aspects ··· I mean the statehooders want all
the benefits of commonwealth, Section 936 and
all the goodies. Independents, they want all of the
obligations that the United States has assumed
toward Puerto Rico.39

Moreover, these corporations are crucial to the Puerto
Rican financial sector. Funds deposited by Section 936
corporations account for approximately 41% of the
commercial bank deposits on the Island.34 Loans
financed by these deposits are expended for mortgages
and government development projects, and thus
furnish capital to the vitally important and
locally-owned construction industries.
In reality, Puerto Rico's economy is excessively
dependent on Section 936, a provisional fiscal
mechanism that was devised by Congress and is
subject to its review and cancellation. Because these
corporations are crucial to the economy, any
phase-out of the Section 936 credit will result in major
dislocations for the Puerto Rican people. Given this,
it is not surprising that the leadership of all the
Island's political parties aggressively petitioned
Congress and the Bush Administration to retain, or
failing this, to agree to a slow and gradual phase-out
of Section 936.
The U.S. government is acutely aware of the
significance of Section 936 tax credits to employment
and investment on the Island. According to U.S.
Treasury official Kenneth Gideon, "a phase-out of
Section 936 would cause economic dislocation in
Puerto Rico," and will result in many firms leaving the
lsland.35 Nonetheless, since 1976 the U.S. Treasury
Department has attempted to persuade Congress to
rescind the Section 936 tax credit as a way of reducing
the federal deficit.
Although defeated by monumental lobbying efforts in
1976 and 1985, the Treasury has, with its
revenue-enhancing allies in Congress, systematically
chipped away at Section 936 and diminished its
profit-enhancing value. In its annual reports on the
"possessions corporation system of taxation," the
Treasury argues that Section 936 is a giveaway for the
multinational corporations and that the U.S. Treasury
foregoes billions of dollars in lost revenue as a
result.36

While Section 936 is seen in Washington as a form of
subsidy for Puerto Rico detrimental to the federal
treasury, in reality Section 936 is a subsidy for U.S.
multinational corporations. The 936 corporations are
criticized for transfering their overseas profits to
Puerto Rico and claiming them as income derived
from their subsidiary operations in the Island. Most
observers feel the fate of Section 936 will be
determined by the U.S. Senate Finance Committee
that is expected to submit a revised referendum bill
sometime in 1990. This committee will no doubt be
barraged by the Puerto Rico, U.SA. Foundation, the
leadership of the Puerto Rican political parties, and
their congressional allies, all of whom will demand
more generous phase-out arrangements for Section

936.
The Bottom Line

Jibaro Statehood Impossible
As stated earlier, the pro-statehood PNP obtained
U.S. Senate Committee approval for most of its
proposals, although in modified form. S.712 retains
the current favorable tax treatment until January 1,
1994 and requires a five-year phase-out of Section 936.
Federal transfer payments would increase immediately
upon certification as a State of the Union because
Puerto Rico would receive equal treatment under the
Constitution.
But the PNP lost on the crucial issue of U.S.
"guarantees" to preserve Puerto Rico's language and
cultural traditions. The U.S. Senate Committee
rejected the sections recognizing Spanish and English
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as official state languages, and Puerto Rico's "... right
to preserve and enhance its rich Hispanic culture.040
In reaction. Rodriguez Matias of the Cclegio de
Abogados declared before the UN Committee of 24
that, '"This violates the fundamental right of any
people to maintain its individuality and cultural
characteristics."'1
The PNP, which has always been vulnerable to the
charge that statehood would result in the destruction
of Puerto Rico's unique cultural attributes, had clearly
included these provisions to assuage voter anxiety.
Gerda Bikales, founding member of the "U.S.
English" movement, revived this apprehension when
she testified before the U.S. Senate Committee that it
was incumbent upon Congress to include provisions in
the bill for informing Puerto Ricans "that statehood
implies a transiti~n to English as the official language
of govemmenL"' In the March 2, 1990 hearing of the
U.S. House Subcommittee on Insular and
International Affairs in Washington, DC, Romero
Barcelo testified that the PNP would no longer insist
on Spanish as the official lanaguge of Puerto Rico
under statehood. He concluded that current U .S.la'WS
on freedom of speech guarantee that the use of
Spanish under statehood would be protected for local
matters.43

A Diluted Enhanced Commonwealth
The U .S. Senate Committee rejected 17 of the 20
provisions in the PPD's proposal for "enhanced
commonwealth." In fact, the Committee concluded,
"H enhanced commonwealth is certified, the
relationship between Puerto Rico and the United
States remains essentially the same...44 Senator
Johnston objected to the section of the PPD's
statement of purposes that referred to the Puerto
Rican people as having "adopted in their own
sovereign right their own Constitution and formed an
autonomous PQlitical community in permanent union
with the" u.s.45 It seemed Hemaltdez Colon was
saying Puerto Rico was sovereign and autonomous,
which are unsustainable conditions since the Island is
an unincorporated territorial possession of the U .S.
subject to the U.S. Constitution. The PPD was
compelled to substitute a statement on the principles
of commonwealth that expressly acknowledged United
.
States soveretgnty
over p uerto Rico.46
The PPD also sought assurances on Section 936.
However, U.S. Treasury official Kenneth W. Gideon
instructed Congress that it "should make clear that tax
benefits such as section 936 cannot be regarded as
benefits that will last indefinitely," but as incentives for
investments subject to Congressional revision.47
The PPD always chafes with discontent when the U .S.
applies legislation and regulations that interfere with

the Commonwealth's management of the local
economy. In order to limit the scope of federal
intervention in this area, the PPD requested a partial
veto of federal statutes. Hernandez Colon requested
authority to notify Congress as to the inappropriateness of U.S.la'WS, with the President being given
the power to declare such la'WS inapplicable if
Congress did not issue a specific finding within sixty
days. This move toward "enhanced autonomy" was
rejected by the Senate Committee on a variety of
grounds, including violation of the principle of
separation of powers. On this issue, S.712 merely
allo'WS the Commonwealth government to ask
Congress to reconsider the applicability of federalla'WS
and establishes a complex legislative procedure that
extends Congressional oversight into Puerto Rican
affairs.

Derailing Independence
The independence proposals were also systematically
weakened. The PIP had requested a twenty-five year
transition period for phasing out Section 936. But the
U.S. Senate Committee recommended termination of
the tax benefit upon proclamation of independence.
The PIP also wanted to establish unrestricted free
trade between the Republic of Puerto Rico and the
United States for twenty-four years. The U.S. Senate
Committee rejected this proposal for preferential
trade relations. Bill S.712 (Section 305) simply calls
for a Joint Transition Commission under the
independence option to develop provisions for
governing trade relations, merely committing Congress
to consider negotiating mutual free trade relations.
To be economically viable, an independent Republic
of Puerto Rico will require U.S. assistance for an
extended period. The PIP requested federal block
grants that amounted to the "aggregate funding of aU
programs" Puerto Rico currently receives, for a period
of ten years, followed by a ten-year phase-out. The
U.S. Senate Committee consented to provide federal
block grants for a period of nine years, the amount to
be negotiated by the Joint Transition Commission. but
estimated at $3.8 billion annually.
Given these conditions, it seems likely an independent
Republic of Puerto Rico will experience major
economic dislocations. With the immediate
termination of Section 936, such a Republic's capacity
to retain multinational corporate investments would be
seriously impaired. For many, the U.S. government
has, by rejecting the economic proposals in the
independence option, openly repudiated its obligation
to provide compensation for ninety-one years of
colonial administration. H Congress retains the
economic provisions in S.12, they will doubtlessly
frustrate efforts by a Republic of Puerto Rico to
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engineer a gradual transition from a dependent colony
to viable independent republic.
In addition, the defense provisions imposed by the
U.S. Senate Committee undermine the principle of
sovereignty that was the linchpin of the independence
proposal. Congress requires specific arrangements for
the use of military installations and territory that
would "come into effect simultaneously with the
proclamation of independence."
These include
unrestricted access to existing military facilities, an
agreement to deny third countries use of Puerto Rican
territory for military purposes without U.S.
authorization, and an agreement that these conditions
are subject to change only by mutual agreement
pursuant to specific Congressional legislation.
Congress has made certification of independence
contingent on resolving these military preoccupations
to the satisfaction of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff.
The Colonial Bias
The revisions to the original S.712, imposed by the
U.S. Senate Committee and the Bush Administration,
will decisively influence the referendum results.
Popular support for the PIP option will be seriously
impaired if independence is perceived to mean future
economic deterioration. Similarly, the PPD's prospects
may have been damaged by its humiliating failure to
obtain changes to the Puerto Rico Federal Relations
Act. which would have bestowed a modicum of
autonomy to the Commonwealth government

On the other hand, statehood now, more the ever,
appears to be a realistic option that enjoys support in
the highest levels of the Bush Administration. Prior
to the hearings, popular skepticism was widespread
about U.S. willingness ever to accept Puerto Rico as
a state. While the doubt still lingers, the Bush
Administration's open endorsement for statehood and
the increased federal transfer payments Puerto Rico
would receive as a state, fortifies the PNP's electoral
prospects, whether or not the referendum is held.
The hearings demonstrated the U.S. government's
resolve to safeguard its security interests and to avoid
incurring additional financial obligations. S.712 reveals
that, while the U.S. government symbolically
acknowledges the right of the Puerto Rican people to
self-determination. in reality it intends to closely
regulate the referendum process. Disputes would be
mediated by the federal courts, the political campaigns
would be financed by Congress, a referendum
information officer would be appointed by the
President of the United States, and United States
Marshalls will monitor the referendum.
Given the history of FBI activities against
independence advocates and socialists, this provision
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has caused alarm among some Puerto Ricans.
Roberto Roldan-Burgos, General Coordinator of the
Puerto Rican Institute of Civil Rights, expressed the
concerns of many independenlistas when he testified
that
FBI and U.S. marshalls committed many civil
rights abuses during the operation of August 30,
1985, in which the alleged macheteros were
arrested. It should be ensured that there is no
such intervention or persecution during this
referendum process.48
The entire process resulting in S.712 was carefully
orchestrated by the U.S. Senate Committee to limit
discussion to a manageable, self-selected group of
political elites and policy makers. The political party
leaders did not hold conventions or meetings of their
membership to discuss the status options and rules for
conducting the referendum.49 Substaptive negotiations
have been, and will continue to be conducted beyond
the scope of public inquiry and participation. While
the hearings in Puerto Rico gave the impression of
open dialogue, this was not a substitute for a
comprehensive and genuinely open discussion of the
complex legal and political issues that a status
referendum entails. Nonetheless, since the hearings
were televised, they were an important vehicle that
enlightened the Puerto Rican population about the
colonial nature of the referendum process.
It would appear the Puerto Rican Independence Party
(PIP) has paid a high price in order to participate in
the referendum. It includes its agreement to relinquish
Puerto Rico's sovereign right over the use of national
territory and to negotiate defense and security
arrangements with allies of its own choosing. In a
1977 report on decolonization, the Colegio de
Abogados de Puerto Rico argued that, •...the
unconditional maintenance of U.S. military bases in
Puerto Rico decisively affects the process of self
determination..oo The Colegio reaffirmed this position
in its testimony before the UN Decolonization
Committee in August 1989.
By conceding sovereignty over natural territory to the
U.S., it could be said that the PIP has been an
accomplice to an act that deprives Puerto Rico of its
"right to self-tietermination and independence ...s1
Even PIP Vice-President Fernando Martin has
referred to S.712 as a "flagrant breach of the minimal
norms of international law on decolonization," and
stated the military provisions "grotesquely" condition
the independence option.52 Why, then, does the PIP
continue to participate in the referendum process?
The PIP says the referendum is "an instrument that
can create positive conditions for an authentic
decolonizing process in the future.-63 It is certain the
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U.S. will not grant Puerto Rico statehood and cites
the U.S. House of Representatives' rejection of the
self-executing provision as an indication of this.
Moreover, Ruben Berrios contends that the
referendum process has discredited the
Commonwealth status and eroded the the PPD's
electoral prospects. He adds that "the plebiscite
process and the participation of the PIP has led the
United States--- voluntarily or by accident--- to begin
to legitimize independencia before the people, giving
it political credibility and economic viability to those
Puerto Ricans who are not independenJistas..64 In the
first hearing of the House Subcommittee on Insular
and International Affairs, the PIP also reaffirmed
Puerto Rico's right to secede under statehood.

United States; and 5) U.S. economic reparations
"necessary for the transition from colonialism to
independence ..66

The View of Socialists and other Independentistas

Since then, some sectors on the left have spumed the
PIP for its continued involvement in the referendum
process. Pensamiento otlico, an important journal of
leftist political thought in Puerto Rico, criticized the
PIP for deluding itself into thinking that independence
could be achieved through the ballot box. They argued
the PIP is organizationally weakened and increasingly
divorced from popular and
community-based
movements as a consequence of its referendum
activities.58

It is important to realize the PIP does not represent
all the political tendencies and social movements that
are calling for Puerto Rico's independence.55 Since
January 17, 1989, when the three political parties
called for a consulta, the position of some sectors of
the independence movement not affiliated with the
PIP has undergone a gradual transformation.

On July 30, 1989, six Puerto Rico-based leftist groups
publicly rejected the U.S. Senate-devised referendum
process as unacce.ptable for failing to comply with
international law.5 But the group did not call for a
boycott at the time, since it was felt this would divide
the independence movement and undermine the
position of the PIP. Rather, they called for grassroots
organizational work. continuous agitation against
S.712, and coordinating the activities of anti-colonial
groupings in order to pressure the United States to
accept international standards and permit Puerto
Ricans to undertake a genuine decolonization process.

The Socialist Reaction

Conforming to International Law
For many socialists and independenJistas, the hearings
were clearly a calculated political exercise designed to
portray the U.S. in a favorable light in the
decolonization hearings in the United Nations this
past August In their testimony before the Senate
Committee, Juan Marl Bras and Carlos Gal lisa (of the
Puerto Rican Socialist Party), the two major figures in
the Puerto Rican socialist movement, supported the
PIP's participation in the referendum process.
However, each rejected S.712 as an exercise in
colonial intervention orchestrated by "pro counsels."
They called for a transfer of sovereign powers to the
Puerto Rican people as a precondition to conducting
a legitimate referendum. Marl Bras, president of
Causa Comun IndependenJista, objected that the U.S.
Senate Committee arbitrarily stipulated the conditions
it would accept for each of the status options.
During an August 12, 1989 march at the United
Nations organized by pro-independence organizations,
a diverse group of speakers called for a boycott of the
"false referendum" and demanded a UN-defined and
supervised plebiscite under the requirements of
international law. The conditions for a legitimate
referendum, according to the organizers, include: 1)
the prior transfer of all sovereign powers to Puerto
Rico; 2) the release of all political prisoners prior to
the transfer of powers; 3) the withdrawal of all U.S.
troops; 4) the participation in the referendum of all
Puerto Ricans whether living on the Island or in the

During hearings, the U.S. Senate Committee and the
Bush Administration expressed hostility to the concept
of transfer of powers, dismissed alternative
referendum proposals, argued that the proposed
referendum complied with international law and
challenged the moral and legal authority of members
of the UN Committee of 24 to rule on the issue of
democratic self-determination for the people of Puerto
Rico. U.S. Senator Johnston has concluded that,
The United Nations' resolutions may reflect
international law, but they do not rise to the
status of international law. International law is a
body of rules devised over the years, and it is not
a statut~ group of laws enacted by the United
Nations.
Ironically, while the U.S. Senate Committee imposed
this limitation on the applicability of UN resolutions,
the U.S. State Department frequently but selectively,
cites the 1953 UN resolutions (that have since been
superseded) to document the U.S. position that Puerto
Rico is not a colony. The U.S. Senate Committee
ultimately rejected "international monitoring of the
referendum because Puerto Rico's political status is
an internal United States matter.-60 For these reasons,
among others cited above, the current referendum bill
is seen by proponents of independence, and even PPD
adherents, as a violation of international law with
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respect to self-determination for the people of Puerto
Rico.
In her testimony at the UN, Colegio President Nora
Rodriguez Matias observed that,
The insistence of the United States to retain its
military installations in Puerto Rico under the
independence formula is a violation with respect
to the territorial integrity of the people according
to resolution 1514(XV) of the United Nations.
United States insistence in maintaining its military
installations in Puerto Rico against the will of the
Puerto Rican people is cause for alarm.
The Colegio de Abogados de Pueno Rico has issued
numerous reports during the last twenty-six years on
various aspects of Puerto Rican-U.S. relations and the
constitutional status of the Puerto Rican people. It
has consistently called for the implementation of a
decolonization process that conforms to international
taw.

In the U.S. Senate hearings held in San Juan,
Rodriguez Matias criticized S.712 because in
redefining each of status options, the Senate
Committee violated the principles of
self-determination. She called for a new bill that
would include the following provisions: 1) that each
status option provide for the sovereignty of the Puerto
Rican people; 2) that the U.S. renounce the power
and authority it exercises over Puerto Rico; 3) that
the U.S. unconditionally transfer these powers to the
Puerto Rican people; 4) that the decolonization
process be free of pressure and interference, including
removal of military forces, to permit equal
participation by all sectors; and -t2 that the United
Nations supervise the referendum. 1
PR0-ELA, a self-declared non-partisan organization
that promotes autonomy for Puerto Rico, testified,
•...if the referendum is held outside the norms of
international law ... [it] should be condemned by the
[UN] Committee as yet another attempt to circumvent
the inalienable ri~t of the Puerto Rican people to
self-determination.& The socialist and independence
representatives similarly denounced the palpably
colonial elements of the U.S. Senate Committee bill.
The United States did, however, score an important
victory at the UN. Puerto Rican independence
advocates were certain that more UN Committee of
24 members would endorse a Cuban draft resolution
on the decolonization of Puerto Rico than in previous
years.63 Venezuela was expected to cast the decisive
vote that would have set the context for a possible
ratification of the resolution when it would be brought
before the Committee of 24 again in 1990. However,
in a demonstration of the significance the United

States truly attaches to the UN hearings, it appears
that Venezuela bowed to pressure from Washington
and abstained from voting. Independence forces were
dismayed at Venezuela's decision to do so on the
grounds that it would be premature for the UN
Committee of 24 to declare Puerto Rico a colony,
given the ongoing referendum process.64
According to Freddy Munoz, General Secretary of the
Venezuela Socialist Movement, "the first reason to
consider for the abstention was that the United States
and Governor Hernandez pressured Venezuela..as
This recent incident suggests the United States is still
compelled to exert its diplomatic weight to combat
growing international pressure to declare Puerto Rico
a colony and thus be forced to relinquish its
sovereignty over the Istand.66
The Consequences to Date
The referendum process has been an event of vital
consequence for the independence movement in
Puerto Rico. It has rekindled a debate that has been
dormant and has unified diverse political tendencies in
opposing colonial rule. Popular reaction against the
referendum increased and support for independence
has widened, as attested to by the unpreceden!ed
anti-colonial march of 70,000 to 80,000 puertorriquenos
in San Juan on June 17, 1989 during the U.S. Senate
hearings. Because of its role in the referendum
process thus far, the Partido Independentista
Puertorriqueno appears to have gained prestige as a
pragmatic political organization, whose leadership is
sophisticated and able to negotiate effectively with
Washington.
Domestically, the ongoing status debate has reinforced
the sense of cultural identity and historical resonance
of the U.S.-resident Puerto Rican population. Ignored
and systematically marginalized, Puerto Ricans have
attained a new political visibility. Puerto Ricans in
the United States have demonstrated their keen
interest in developments on the Island and are
demanding that their voices be heard on matters
pertaining to the future of Puerto Rico. The Puerto
Rican political leadership on the Island has been
forced to contend with the reality that they must
acknowledge the important role of the exile Puerto
Rican population in any process that may lead to a
redefinition of Puerto Rico's political status.
In recognition of this reality, the U.S. House
Subcommittee on Insular and International Affairs
recently announced plans to hold a hearing on June 8,
1990 in New York City in East Harlem (El Barrio).
According to the press release announcing this
hearing.
...de Lugo (Chair of the subcommittee) pointed
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out that, contrary to a published report in San
Juan, Congress has not "dismissed" a proposal for
Puerto Ricans in the United States to vote in the
referendum. The issue has not been addressed
yet.67
Despite these important political and social
by-products, many Puerto Ricans on the Island feel
that the status debate has resulted in a lamentable
consumption of political resources and intellectual
talent that could be better used to address the
deplorable human conditions on the Island. The
maladies that afflict Puerto Rico are many, ranging
from grinding poverty for large sectors of the
population to an impending ecological disaster, from
incompetent and ineffective government agencies to
the serious deterioration of social institutions.
For these Puerto Ricans, the status debate has
distracted attention from the genuinely critical issues
that threaten the decomposition of society and it has
absolved the government and political leadership from
responsibly addressing these matters. Moreover, they
point out that important victories in civil rights,
working conditions, housing, environmental protection,
and other critical areas, have been achieved through
political organizing and struggle, and not through the
ballot box. Whether the crisis that confronts Puerto
Rican society is a function of colonialism, symptomatic
of a wider process of social and ecological deterioration typical of modem societies, or a combination
of both, is of secondary concern for this sector of the
Puerto Rican people. What is in doubt is the
seriousness of the United States claim to be willing to
relinquish its colonial grasp over Puerto Rico.
These concerns are particularly relevant since there is
a growing realization that it is doubtful the
referendum will be held, given Congressional
degradation of the status formulas and the feuding
between U .S. Senate and House Committees over the
final version of bill.68 But if it is held according to the
conditions set by S.712, it appears that one or more of
the three parties will boycott the referendum, thus
discrediting the outcome.

the results in the international arena as a free and
binding decision by the Puerto Rican people in support of either annexation or colonialism. Doubtless,
the issue of Puerto Rico will continue before the
UN.In this context, given the intensity of Puerto Rican
nationalism that crosses all party lines, the U.S.
government might ponder Carlos Gallisa's alarm:
lf...you insist on asserting the colonial rule or in
forcefeeding us the culmination of that rule which
is statehood, you would find yourselves not with
a 51st state, but with a Northern Ireland within
your confederation.o09
The unanswered question is whether the U.S.
government is willing to orchestrate a charade that
leaves unresolved the very problems that have
compelled it to address the crisis of colonialism in the
first place. The dilemma of whether to participate in
the referendum or to repudiate it as an exercise in
imperial manipulation is under intense debate within
the independence movement. Some within the
movement see independence as a historical
inevitability and define their task as one of pressing
the U .S. government to recognize the existence of the
Puerto Rican nation and to accept the impossibility of
harmoniously integrating the Island and its people into
the metropolis. In the long term, it may be in the best
interests of the U .S. government to devise a
decolonization process that truly respects the
principles of self-determination for Puerto Rico. •
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A referendum that fails to respect the principle of
self-determination will lack any legitimacy and
undoubtedly fail to resolve the Island's colonial status.
Nonetheless, the U.S. will no doubt attempt to portray
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